A lthough the now classic MIS research article b y Mason and Mitroff58 highlighted the importance o f understanding both behavioralist and rational-economi c viewpoints in the conduct of MIS research, there ha s been considerably more emphasis on the former in current work . However, the MIS researcher interested i n economic issues is faced with a vast amount of publishe d research by economists in a bewildering number of topical areas . In an attempt to rectify the problem, this pape r examines some of the major themes in economics whic h we believe are not only relevant to scholars interested i n MIS research, but also to practitioners interested in understanding economic issues and their application t o MIS .
A lthough the now classic MIS research article b y Mason and Mitroff58 highlighted the importance o f understanding both behavioralist and rational-economi c viewpoints in the conduct of MIS research, there ha s been considerably more emphasis on the former in current work . However, the MIS researcher interested i n economic issues is faced with a vast amount of publishe d research by economists in a bewildering number of topical areas . In an attempt to rectify the problem, this pape r examines some of the major themes in economics whic h we believe are not only relevant to scholars interested i n MIS research, but also to practitioners interested in understanding economic issues and their application t o MIS .
Our presentation will center on results in three genera l areas : (1) those that concern the effect of information
The authors are with Carnegie-Mellon University an d Stanford University, respectively. upon economic markets external to the firm, (2) thos e that concern issues of information and its relation to decision making and the internal organization of the firm , and those that concern questions of allocation and contro l of (3) information resources within the firm . Althoug h the relevant economics literature encompassed by thes e three areas is vast, we will attempt to highlight some o f the salient results relevant to MIS researchers and practitioners, attempting to integrate these aspects of economi c theory into their thinking about MIS . Necessarily, commentary will be brief and interested readers are referre d to the articles listed in the bibliography to obtain bette r understanding of the mathematical models employed b y economists in these areas .
The paper is organized as follows . After providin g some background material, attention is directed to th e first general area, namely the effect of information o n exchange economies and production economies . This is followed under the second general area by consideratio n of the economics of information applied to individual decision making within the firm, which is then extended t o the multi-person case under the topic of organizationa l design . Within organizational design, consideration i s given to team theory and a variation of it known as decomposition theory. The second general area conclude s with a summary of relevant game theoretic models an d their implications for MIS research . Finally, the thir d general area focuses upon pricing and incentive issues i n allocating and controlling formalized MIS services within the firm .
I
n order to appreciate fully recent research in the economics of information and its application to MIS, on e must first have a clear understanding of the framewor k embedded in the traditional competitive market model a t the level of an intermediate micro-economics text . Although many textbooks would qualify as backgroun d reading in this area, a very useful and appealing presentation is given in the first few chapters of Sharpe 80 . Thi s text summarizes much of conventional micro-economi c theory and gives an interesting application of it to th e economics of computers . Unfortunately, much of th e data on computers utilized in this text is dated .
Another framework important in understanding th e economics of information is provided by what has com e to be called "communications theory, " based upon th e pioneering work of Shannon 79 . Useful notions related t o information encoding and channel capacity are presente d there. Although communications theory per se has no t had significant impact upon research themes in the economics of information, Shannon ' s ideas embodied th e first attempt to quantify information content and methods of encoding information to achieve a given level o f reliability. Much of the terminology associated with communications design originated with this work . However , Shannon-oriented theories ignore the crucial value-of-information question by tacitly assuming that all information is equal-valued to the decision maker, an unduly restrictive assumption .
While this might be useful for the engineering desig n of reliable and efficient communication channels, it remained for Arrow , to extract meaningful interpretation s of it in the context of decision-making economic theor y and organizations . This non-technical, but abstruse, book is full of economic ideas useful for theories of MIS . I n particular, Arrow develops analogies between information channels and managerial decision making by considering an information system as a form of channel involving irreversible managerial investment in it s development and whose intended use is in the context o f highly uncertain payoffs . He conjectures that in such a context the private incentive of decision makers to inves t in new "channels " may be very low relative to the potential organization-wide benefits of its deployment . If on e considers an MIS to be a kind of "channel, " the analog y is quite suggestive of further MIS research ideas .
A useful non-technical framework for examining th e relationship of information to economic decision makin g is found in Marschak 55 . This surprisingly prophetic article first identified societal trends toward the "knowledg e economy" and developed in a straightforward way th e jargon frequently associated with the information economics area . Indeed, much of today ' s research in economics of information can be traced to the pioneerin g work by Marschak in this and other articles by him52, 53 ,
54, and 5 6
Readers interested in a useful discussion of some o f these fundamental economic issues, applied specificall y to a computer-related problem, are referred to Emery 25 . Finally, a theme of research involving empirical study o f managerial decision making in economic contexts wit h the use of alternative information systems is summarize d in Dickson et al . 20 . This collection of studies shows ho w some simple ideas related to economics of information can be useful in developing MIS research themes in thi s area .
E
FFECT OF INFORMATION UPON ECONOMI C MARKETS . An ongoing theme in current economics literature involves models of a competitive economy i n which information is explicitly treated endogenously . Although these models are often mathematically complex , the underlying motivations are quite straightforward : to examine the effect of information upon efficiency and allocation issues within the traditional competitive marke t framework . One example of this is found in Ackerloff ' who examined the misallocations that can occur whe n sellers and buyers have differential information about th e "quality" of products . In particular, he demonstrates th e Pareto inferior movements that are made in a competitiv e economy when buyers have incomplete information concerning the true state of traded commodities . In this cas e a Pareto inferior movement means that at least one person, the buyer, is worse off after the trade than before .
In the context of "pure exchange " economies in whic h no production of goods occurs, considerable research ha s been directed at the impact of the information on marke t equilibria . Development of the theory can be found in, fo r example, Hirshleifer 37 and Ng 66 . Marshall 57 provides a good summary of this research .
Although models differ, the underlying theme is that , in a state-preference model of a pure exchange economy , the public revelation of information, even if costlessly obtained, is at best socially valueless . While this may seem surprising, the underlying rationale is reasonably clear. Under a limited definition of social welfare, involvin g consideration of Pareto superior movement in the competitive equilibrium, if information is publicly disclose d about uncertain future or otherwise unobservable "state s of the world" prior to trading, then at least one trader wil l be made strictly worse off than he would be if trades were effected prior to the uncertain future state but without the information . Moreover, those (rare) situations, i n which public information is released yielding a net (windfall) gain to all traders, occur only in the economicall y uninteresting case in which no change in trading occur s over the no-public-information case . Since public information is never completely costless to obtain in practice , society is made strictly worse off, even in the windfal l case, because resources must be devoted to gathering an d disseminating the public information ! While this result may not at first be considered relevant to MIS in organizations, it clearly does highligh t several non-obvious issues related to the impact of information . First, one must be careful in defining criteri a when dealing with the impact of information . The nonusefulness of the public information result hangs critically on the common assumption by economists tha t interpersonal comparisons of "well-offness " among undominated economic equilibria are not considered . Publi c information is "valuable " only if a Pareto superior movement in the competitive equilibrium occurs . That is, if th e revelation of public information would make at least on e person worse off in his trading prospects, then the information is considered socially harmful by economists eve n if many other traders would be made better off in term s of their expected wealth after revelation of the public information . In addition, because most of these results depend critically on the assumption of homogeneity o f traders' prior beliefs (prior to the revelation of information), one must very carefully define the assumptions relevant to how information affects decision making .
More important to MIS research is the ancillary development in these models of the distinction between th e private and social value of information . Both Hirshleife r and Marshall emphasize this distinction . It can be show n in these models that even though the public revelation o f information is socially valueless, there is nevertheless a n expected gain ex ante to an individual wishing to acquir e the same information privately. That is, there is no valu e to publicly releasing the information ; but a single selfserving individual could obtain benefit from privately acquiring the same information and using this informational advantage to condition his trading prior t o everyone else learning it .
The insidiousness of this result is clear. If there is private gain to a trader by acquiring information, then al l traders will invest in information systems to obtain signals about uncertain but relevant states of the world . However, if everyone obtains this information then it becomes "public" and therefore at best no improvement occurs and society is the loser from excessive investments i n MIS . It is important to note that this result holds even i f there are "insurance" markets allowing (risk-adverse ) traders to hedge against the occurrence of undesirable states of the world . If such hedging is (costlessly) allowed, then the release of potentially adverse informatio n harms no one (in an ex ante sense), since everyone is "insured ;" but society is out the cost of the information gathering process itself .
Again, these results appear to hinge critically upon tw o assumptions : homogeneous beliefs by traders about states of the world (all traders have the same probability distributions over states) and the absence of productive technology (no production of goods is conditional on the information) .
These latter results have direct implications for MIS i n organizations . First, these models suggest that the development of MIS in the public sector for the accumulatio n and disclosure of "public information " is not necessaril y always desirable, at least under the restrictive Pareto dominance criteria . Second, these results highlight a notion which has much broader implications for MIS ; namely, that there may be in practice substantial differences in the private incentives by managers to acquir e additional information for decision making from tha t which is more broadly or socially desirable . The implications for the over-investment in MIS are obvious an d there may be direct parallels between these results as applied to, for example, a divisionalized organization i n which the individual managers from their narrow perspective have incentive to invest excessively in MIS i n light of what is best from overall organizational objectives .
On the other hand, more recent research in this are a has produced counter-examples that challenge the socia l uselessness of information result, even in the case of pure exchange economies . Models developed by, for example , Verrecchia 92 and Ohlson' l focus upon the homogeneity o f beliefs assumption in these early models . Verrecchia ha s shown, for example, that in the context of "sufficientl y heterogeneous " beliefs that the result does not hold . Moreover, it is commonly agreed that in an economy involving production, as well as exchange, in which the revelation of information can affect not only trades but als o productive opportunities, that public information nee d not be socially valueless . However, even in this contex t there are likely to be differential incentives to acquir e information from what is socially optimal .
In a contrasting vein, Wilson 95 develops several simpl e models to illustrate how the acquisition of informatio n can dramatically affect outcomes when production o f goods can occur. In a novel approach to formulatin g models, he demonstrates that, under uncertainty, a producer faced with a constant returns-to-scale productiv e technology could nevertheless, through the acquisition o f information, exhibit economies of scale in the marketplace . That is, the combined effects of production an d information permit the organization to achieve economies of scale even if the underlying production technology has no such economies . The implications of this an d similar models to our understanding the role of MIS ar e obvious and this is a fruitful area for further studies .
Interested readers are also referred to Hurwicz38 and Alchian and Demsetz 2 , who have developed, somewha t technically, additional models illustrating the richnes s with which information can affect the comparative statics of economic models .
NFORMATION, DECISION MAKING, AND IN-TERNAL ORGANIZATION . INDIVIDUAL DECI-SION MAKING .
The impact of information upo n decision making by a single individual is now a commo n topic in management science textbooks . Since most management science textbooks treat topics such as Bayesia n revision and the expected value of perfect information , they will not be surveyed here. However, useful summaries of this and related ideas can be found in Marschak 52 , Stigler89 , and Arrows . Discussions of the behavioral impact of information in economic decision making can b e found in Simon 8i . 82 , while an interesting empirical application of the impact of information upon economic decision making can be found in Chervany and Dickson 12 . Less well known in the individual decision-making literature and of immediate relevance to MIS researchers i s the work on comparisons of information structures . A seminal contribution to this literature was made b y Blackwell 9 , but since it was published in a statistical journal, its relevance to economics and MIS went largely unnoticed until recently . Although not explicitl y documented as such in the information literature, a concise, readable summary of it is given by McGuire b° fo r the case of discrete signals . Marschak and Miyasawa s°p resent the full thoery with some extensions, the readin g of which requires considerable mathematical dexterity .
Essentially, Blackwell views an information syste m (structure) as a device which produces " signals " abou t unobservable states of the world to a decision maker . H e then incorporates this signalling, via the information systern, into a Savage-rational model of decision making i n the standard way . In this context the function of the information signal is to modify the decision maker's unconditional prior probability over which of the states wil l obtain by conditioning on the observed signal . This i s then used to calculate expected payoff over alternativ e actions, given the observed signal, so as to determine th e payoff maximizing action given the signal .
Blackwell assumes that the decision maker must selec t one of several alternative signal-generating informatio n systems before observing the specific signal . To do this , the payoffs resulting from the optimal actions, given th e possible signals that could be generated from each of th e alternative information systems, are weighted by the decision maker ' s prior probability of observing the signal s in order to compare the relative payoff of the alternativ e information structures . This allows the decision maker t o rank order the information structures according to th e expected payoffs derived from utilizing them .
Blackwell then asks the question, "Under what conditions can alternative information structures be rank ordered without going through the process of determinin g payoff maximizing decisions for each candidate structure?" In addressing this he develops the notion of "fineness " of an information structure . Loosely speaking, on e (costless) information structure is finer than another i f the first structure yields a more precise description o f which of the states will occur than the second .
Not all information structures can be ranked by th e fineness criterion . Basically, his theorem establishes tha t one information structure is generally preferred to another if it can be shown to be finer . While this is intuitivel y obvious (the finer structure tells you as much and possibly more about which of a set of states has occurred), th e value of Blackwell ' s Theorem is the concrete operationalization of the concepts employed . In addition, the rea l practical value of Blackwell ' s Theorem appears to b e those situations when it does not apply. The MIS implications of this case are developed in detail by Moore" .
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN. Organizational design refers to the class of problems in which the organizational structure itself is treated as a controllable variabl e which is causally related to organizational performance by some criteria . Although there has been no definitiv e work in addressing the optimal design of organization s even in the economics literature, the models which hav e been developed in organizational design have direct an d immediate implication for MIS . Organizational design i s a somewhat confusing rubric, largely because there is a considerable body of sociological literature which examines the behaviorally oriented aspects of the design of organizations, Useful background reading of this literatur e is essential if MIS researchers are to apply intelligentl y the economics of information models related to organization design . Background reading on the behavioral aspects of organizational design can be found in Cyert an d March' s, 16 . An extensive summary of recent work in thi s area can be found in Moore 65 .
Economists have differentiated their research into organization design from the sociologists by viewing organizations primarily as formalized, impersonal , goal-seeking systems which, under decentralization, ca n be partitioned into a collection of goal-seeking subsytem s according to some rules of hierarchy . The thrust in thi s research has been to examine models of such organizations from a normative perspective so as to, for example , examine effects of alternative hierarchies upon the problem of coordinating the interacting subsystems. In thi s more narrow economics arena, organizational design refers to the application of economic theory in multi-perso n organizations in which the effect of markets, if any, i s indirect or minimal .
The operative question is, "What structures and decision-making procedures should be adopted in order t o make rational decisions, in some sense, in the absence o f complete markets?" Background reading in this area can be found in Hirshleifer34, 35, 36 , Hurwicz3a, 39, 40 , and Arrow and Hurwicz 6 . Advanced treatment of the economic s of internal organizations is given by Spence", Stiglitz 90 , and readings in McGuire and Radner 59 . A more broadly based and less mathematical treatment of the philosophical issues related to the economics of organization desig n can be found in Williamson 93 , Grochla and Szyperski 29 , Hea1 33 , Galbraith 27 , and Marschak 56 . Most of these authors attempt to address organizational design from tw o perspectives : (1) that of organizational design as regard s centralization versus decentralization with particular emphasis upon specialization and incentives in decentralize d environments and (2) resource allocation in decentralize d organizations . More will be said about resource allocation in a subsequent section .
CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZA-TION.
Decentralization is of interest to MIS because i n almost all cases authors have defined decentralization i n terms critically related to information economics . That is, firms are viewed as decentralized if discretionary decision-making authority is delegated to subsystems withi n the organization ; there is some degree of informationa l autonomy among the subsystems ; and, finally, the decision made by one subsystem influences the .goal attainment by other subsystems . Organizational desig n theories encompass a wide range of alternatives from th e somewhat uninteresting case of a fully centralized organization, which contains no subsystems, to the fully separable organization in which identifiable subsystems d o not interact .
The interest in these models from an MIS perspectiv e stems from the fact that these models necessarily identif y quite concretely the nature of the information flows, distributed computation, managerial incentives, and detailed bureaucratic procedures as components of th e organizational design process . That is, although the motives of economists have been to compare organizationa l designs or to address resource allocations, the informational "byproducts" of these models are of considerabl e interest in developing theories of normative MIS desig n which can stand the test of rigor . Furthermore, many o f these alternative models have proven to be sufficientl y rich in structure to capture one or more observable tenet s of actual managerial behavior in organizations, at leas t as it pertains to formalized decision-making procedures .
For example, versions of these models cannot only illustrate, but demonstrate, the optimality of the need fo r increased communication as organizations with high interaction among subsystems decentralize their decisio n making . More importantly, the exact nature of the messages among various subsystems and the signals from th e environment, as components of the MIS, are operationally defined and their economic value can be imputed i n some cases .
Although organizational design models have bee n largely ignored by MIS researchers, there have bee n many specific models proposed that are relevant. For expository convenience alone, a game theoretic paradig m will be offered to examine organizational design . Tea m theory and decomposition theory will be used to illustrat e cooperative game models, while a brief discussion of incentive compatible models and agency theory will be use d to illustrate applications of non-cooperative game theory.
TEAM THEORY.
Team theory was originally developed by Marschak 53, 54 . Marschak defines an organization to be "a group of persons whose actions agree wit h certain rules that further their common interests " and a team as "an organization in which its members have onl y common interests . " That is, team theory models (1) eliminate non-cooperative behavior from multi-person organization models, concentrating instead upon the design o f communication networks and the specification of decision rules for the agents in a decentralized organizatio n when scarce resources must be allocated to competin g uses ; (2) assume the goal of the organization is expressible as a single non-separable objective function ; and, finally, (3) assume uncertainty in environmental variable s affecting outcomes is present . Example models incorporating these ideas can be found in Radner72, 73, 74 while much of the work has been unified in a book b y Marschak and Radner sl .
An example of an interesting team model would be on e in which agents in a decentralized organization each independently observe, via an MIS, noisy signals relevan t to their own economic environment ; but the environment s are correlated such that intelligent "sharing " of the ob- 
DECOMPOSITION THEORY.
The mathematica l programming approach to organizational design is closely related to team theory and is based in concept on th e decomposition of mathematical programs as representations of the fundamental decision-making problem face d by a decentralized organization . The approach taken i n this literature is to examine alternative ways of breakin g down the overall problem faced by the organization into a series of smaller problems whose composite solution s yield the solution to the overall organizational problem .
MIS interest in this approach is stimulated by the organizational implications drawn from the alternative methods of breaking down or, more precisely, decomposing the overall problem . That is, if the overall proble m can be decomposed in alternate ways, each of which induces a different organizational structure, then the problem of organizational design is to evaluate the desirabilit y of one versus another of these decompositions .
Again, from an MIS standpoint, these decomposition s are of interest primarily because of the iterative solutio n procedure commonly associated with decompositio n models . After each interaction, information must be communicated among subordinate agents and between subordinate agents and a superior in order to begin the nex t iteration . The analogy between these models and concepts of management control and coordination via information and communication systems is obvious . Background reading in this area can be found in Baumol an d Tibor 8 , Burton and Obel i ', Ruefii77 and Jennergren 41 . MIS readers of this literature must be careful to see beyond the narrow resources allocative focus of these models in order to concentrate upon the normative MI S implications .
A specific example of how these models can be utilize d to evaluate alternative information systems is given by Freeland and Moore26 . In this model it was shown that a highly plausible and intuitively appealing informatio n system in which subordinate agents communicate "bids " for desired resources can be shown not to work in th e sense that the overall organizational problem would never be solved unless a richer information system were utilized . By richer it is meant that non-bid-related message s must be allowable for the imposed coordination to be effective . An empirical application of decomposition theory to study the effects of alternative information system s can be found in Moore6 -. GAME AND AGENCY THEORY. Non-cooperativ e game theory makes the same assumptions as in team theory except that the agents do not share a common goal , thereby inducing non-cooperative behavior . Fundamenta l background reading is, of course, von Neumann an d Morgenstern 96 . Although the published literature in noncooperative games is sizeable, one segment of it, agenc y theory, is of immediate relevance to MIS .
Agency theory considers the special case of two, or possibly more, individuals in which one individual, the principal, hires another individual, who possesses technolog y or expertise, to act as his agent in the conduct of som e decision-making task . Since it is assumed that the agen t does not necessarily share the same objectives as the principal, these models cover a wide range of practical situations . Furthermore, in most cases the principal is unabl e DATA BASE Fall 1982 35 to be completely informed about some aspect of th e agent ' s problem, such as his utility function or the exac t nature of the resources or expertise offered by the agent .
The goal in agency theory is often to establish contracts which induce incentives for the agent to act in complete accordance with the preferences of the principal , despite initially conflicting objectives, or to devise penalty or sanction schemes to prevent decision making by th e agent which would not be in the interests of the principal . Useful references in this area are given by Ross75 . 76 , Spence and Zeckhauser 87 , Amershi 3 , and Mirrelees61 , Incentives and incentive-compatible control of decentralized organizations in this context have been studied b y Groves 30 , Loeb 48 , and Demski and Feltham 18 . The interesting case of a collection of principals without necessarily identical tastes who must reach a common decisio n under uncertainty was discussed in a seminal paper b y Wilson 94 .
While there are insights useful for MIS in examinin g these models, there would appear to be numerous areas i n which the models themselves could be applied in furthe r understanding MIS related issues . For example, the application of agency theory of incentive compatibilit y models to the contracting for software development or t o the design of MIS systems themselves fits nicely with th e assumptions commonly employed in these theories . Extensions of these and similar models to the case of th e single principal and multiple agents are currently underway and could provide a richer context for modeling information systems in hierarchical organizations .
A LLOCATION AND CONTROL OF INFORMA-TION SYSTEMS . Information systems for management, as well as other environments, require investments in resources . This fact immediately raise s questions regarding how the use of these resources shoul d be allocated and controlled within the firm . Typically, such questions focus on the formal information system s in existence or under consideration and the organizational unit, such as an EDP or MIS department, " officially " assigned the primary responsibility for providing an information processing capability. The output of an IS department is an intermediate means to some other, fina l purpose of the consumer or principal in the firm .
For example, an IS report provides the basis for a management decision . Thus, it is well recognized in principl e that the "true costs" of IS are those incurred indirectl y through the realized or lost opportunities of the consumers ; and as such, they are "hidden " from the accountin g system in place. Nonetheless, resource allocation an d control in practice usually translates into monitoring, estimation, and recovery of direct costs . Many of these direct costs are relatively fixed (e .g ., physical equipmen t and labor), although a number of them do vary with I S output and some outputs are discretionary (e .g ., systems development) .
In a series of articles17, 28, 69, 70 , Nolan has surveye d contemporary EDP administrative practices by a numbe r of organizations, especially management policies with regard to control . For example, despite recognition that I S is a support function and the IS department is a cost center, in some firms EDP is organized as a profit center ; i n other firms EDP costs are allocated as (pure) overhead . Nolan hypothesizes that the supply (or availability) o f EDP services in an organization experiences differen t and distinct "stages of growth"28, 70 in response to variou s characteristics of user demand and the environment . To manage EDP effectively, he advocates that control policies, such as charge-out systems or resource pricing , should be flexible and adapt to the conditions of a give n stage . For example, management might subsidize price s during early growth and full-cost or monopoly-price services in excess demand stages to contain expenditures . Under a charge-out system, a customer is charged fo r service on a job-by-job basis according to some formul a as a function of resources used and unit prices (e .g ., see 42) .
Rather than rely on conventional wisdom exclusively, we can productively consult economic theory for some insight on these issues . First, given the support status of the IS department, one should seek an objective whic h maximizes the net discounted value of this group's outpu t to the firm . That is, if one measures this value only as th e department ' s profits (or the producer' s surplus), it is wel l known from economics that the firm will incur a loss i n benefits or welfare (what economist' s call "consumers ' surplus") . Thus, value should be measured as the sum o f the producer and consumer surplus . A second consideration at the outset is whether or not the IS department i s a monopoly in providing services or if organizational customers have access to external suppliers . Typically, i n most large organizations, the monopoly situation (or a variant on it) prevails with exceptions being made fo r unique capabilities, such as access to a commercia l databank .
How should services be priced? The answer to thi s question depends on how much of the real world complexity one wishes to capture in a model of the environment44, 45, 67, 68, 83-86 . For example, consider the simplest o f worlds in which we have a single productive resource ; a single output ; a known, fixed planning horizon over discrete time periods ; and known demands in each period . We wish to determine prices in each period and how much resource capacity to procure .
Under the normal assumptions on "well-behaved" demand and cost functions, the optimal pricing and investment policy may be characterized as follows . In eac h period where capacity is not binding, produce the amoun t demanded and set price equal to marginal variable cost s at total output . The difference (or present value of the difference) between a "market clearing price " based on the aggregate (inverse) demand function and the marginal variable cost at a given output level (and in a give n period) can be interpreted as the marginal opportunit y cost (or value) of capacity at that output level (and tim e period) . When there is slack, this marginal (opportunity ) value is zero . In each period where capacity is binding , set total output at capacity and set price equal to th e marginal variable cost at capacity plus the future worth of the marginal (opportunity) value of capacity for tha t period . The investment criterion is to purchase capacit y up to the point where the total marginal (opportunity ) value of it is equal to its marginal (purchase) cost ove r the planning horizon .
Some observations are worth noting on even this simpl e case analysis because the results in more realistic bu t complicated models are similar, notwithstanding the algebraic details . First, there is no price discrimination b y user---a desirable feature . (Under a profit maximizatio n criterion, there will be price discrimination in favor o f users with greater demand elasticities .) Second, there i s differential pricing to reflect peak-and off-peak-deman d periods, wherein peak-demand consumers pay a premium . Third, if the operating and investment cost function s are linear, then marginal costs equal average costs an d the cited decision rules will recover total costs . Note i n this instance that the total investment cost is recovere d from the peak-demand period users only . More generally, however, the cost functions would be non-linear, whic h means that the optimal policy is for the firm to subsidiz e IS use .
If operating costs are a pseudo-concave function o f output, a dynamic version of the basic model yields th e following behavior . At low output relative to capacity , marginal costs are significantly below average cost an d users are heavily subsidized . As output (use) expands , marginal and average costs converge, and the amount o f the subsidy is reduced . At the point where marginal cost s equal and/or exceed average costs, it is optimal for th e firm to expand capacity in order to recapture consume r surplus returning to the high subsidy situation .
The basic model has been generalized by Kriebel e t a1 44 . In that analysis, the assumptions are heterogeneou s resource capacities by age (or vintage) ; costs as a function of system load, capacity, and resource age ; resource replacement ; and an infinite planning horizon . (Renta l vs . purchase decisions are also included within the framework as a special case ; see also 80 .) Among the results we obtain is the determination of a natural planning subhorizon that is finite and corresponds to the duration of tim e an individual resource is actively employed in production . The analysis also shows that when it becomes optimal t o dispose of a particular resource vintage, it is optimal to replace all of that resource vintage's capacity (or equivalently, to "write off" all of its economic value) .
A number of other models have appeared in the economics literature dealing with various aspects of pricin g for the allocation and control of information services i n computer communications networks (e .g ., ' 9,24,70 . Space limitations preclude a review of this work here . A revie w of some of this literature can be found in Moore°3 . In most of these cases, as above, the analyses postulate the existence of user demand functions and output cos t functions (or equivalently production and expenditure s functions) . There is reasonably good evidence availabl e in the literature to support the contention that IS production and cost functions can be developed (e .g .,'4, 45 47, 80 ) There has also been empirical work done at the industry and the firm level in identifying and estimating demand functions, (e .g ., 10,'3,'4) . The evidence is somewha t less satisfactory at the intraorganizational level for departments or individuals . Some work has been done b y Streeter9 ' on IS demand by "computer-dependent workers" ; however, demand by the general consumer (th e manager or professional) has not been studied in an y depth . One obvious problem here is indentifiability, sinc e many (if not most) general consumers are passive agent s in their interactions with IS . Another issue concerns the definition and measurability of IS outputs in general, i .e . , in determining what to include or exclude . In the area o f MIS we do not have a convenient metric as a basis fo r quantifying output and communicating requirements .
From some of the recent literature, it appears that a productive way to approach the individual demand problem may be indirectly through the mechanism of incentives . That is, assume individuals are rational and tha t each knows (personally) the value or impact on his welfare of a given of potential IS output . This might be viewed as the individual's "reservation price " for the commodity, i .e ., he would be willing to pay up to tha t price and not more . If these reservation prices were public, they could be used to set priorities and allocate output, since in the aggregate they constitute the "tru e value" to the user population . But for selfish reasons individuals have no natural inclination to reveal them ; and, t o the contrary, it may be in their self-interest to lie .
Can a scheme be designed through which an individua l maximizes his own welfare by revealing his true "reservation prices'? " Dolan 2 '-23 has investigated this issue in th e context of congested service systems and the cost to user s of delays in receiving service . He shows that a "priorit y price " should be based on "marginal delay cost that services at any time impose on other users . " Harris et al. 32 have also studied the general problem i n the presence of asymmetric information and divergen t preferences (i .e ., between users or divisions and the resource allocating authority or headquarters) . They show that for a particular (linear) model structure, certai n forms of (rank ordered) transfer pricing schedules ar e optimal (cost-minimizing) allocation mechanisms . I n general, these issues merit further research as a basis fo r enhanced organization design .
ven under the space limitations of this brief survey, 1< ' .d it should be clear that there is substantial interactio n between MIS and economic theory. The relative inattention to economic issues related to the impact of information by MIS researchers is serious . Although behaviora l theories related to such things as cognitive informatio n processing, implementation of MIS, and management o f the MIS design process are important to our understanding of this complex topic, in the final analysis the goal o f an MIS should be improvement in decision-making effectiveness . We believe that incorporation of economi c theory into MIS research should be central to achievin g that goal .
